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We hypothesize that if election results are manipulated or forged,
then, due to the well-known human attraction to round numbers, the
frequency of reported round percentages can be increased. To test
this hypothesis, we analyzed raw data from seven federal elections
held in the Russian Federation during the period from 2000 to 2012
and found that in all elections since 2004 the number of polling sta-
tions reporting turnout and/or leader’s result expressed by an integer
percentage (as opposed to a fractional value) was much higher than
expected by pure chance. Monte Carlo simulations confirmed high
statistical significance of the observed phenomenon thereby suggest-
ing its man-made nature. Geographical analysis showed that these
anomalies were concentrated in a specific subset of Russian regions
which strongly suggests its orchestrated origin. Unlike previously pro-
posed statistical indicators of alleged electoral falsifications, our ob-
servations can hardly be explained differently but by a widespread
election fraud.
1. Introduction. Human attraction to round numbers (such as e.g.
multiples of 5 or 10) is a well-known psychological phenomenon, frequently
observed e.g. in sports, examinations (Pope and Simonsohn, 2011), stock
markets (Harris, 1991; Kandel, Sarig and Wohl, 2001; Osler, 2003), pric-
ing (Klumpp, Brorsen and Anderson, 2005), tipping (Lynn, Flynn and He-
lion, 2013), census data (Yule, 1927), survey results (Crawford, Weiss and
Suchard, 2014), etc. Excess of round numbers in such data is sometimes
called “heaping” (Crawford, Weiss and Suchard, 2014). One likely inter-
pretation of this phenomenon is that round numbers act as reference points
when people are judging possible outcomes (Pope and Simonsohn, 2011). Re-
cently, this phenomenon has helped catching data manipulations or forgery
in cases of scientific misconduct (Simonsohn, 2013). Here we hypothesize
that a similar effect could show up in electoral data as well: if election re-
sults are manipulated or forged, then the frequency of reported round per-
centages should be increased. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed raw data
from seven federal elections held in the Russian Federation during the period
from 2000 to 2012 and compared it to similar elections in other countries.
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2 D. KOBAK ET AL.
Russia presents an unusual case of a country where all raw electoral data
are freely available for inspection, but election results are allegedly subject
to forgery. Indeed, Russian federal elections after the year 2000 have often
been accused of numerous falsifications, in particular on the grounds of mul-
tiple anomalies in the raw election data (Mikhailov, 2004; Mebane, 2006;
Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin, 2009; Mebane and Kalinin, 2010; Klimek
et al., 2012; Simpser, 2013; Ziegler, 2013; Enikolopov et al., 2013). Con-
vincing as these indictments are, they all have serious limitations: some are
indirect (Mikhailov, 2004; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin, 2009) or model-
based (Klimek et al., 2012), while the reported anomalies can in principle
be explained by social, geographical or other confounding factors (Cole-
man, 2004; Churov, Arlazarov and Soloviev, 2008; Hansford and Gomez,
2010). Some are based on field experiments (Enikolopov et al., 2013) con-
ducted in one single city; some rely on Benford’s law (Mebane, 2006; Mebane
and Kalinin, 2010), were criticized for that (Deckert, Myagkov and Or-
deshook, 2011), and are now deemed inconclusive (Mebane, 2013a,b; Mack
and Shikano, 2013). The position of Russian authorities has always been
that the official results of all Russian elections are genuine1.
Here we focus on another statistical anomaly: elevated frequency of round
percentages in the election results. Anomalously high incidence of multiple-
of-five percentages in some Russian federal elections has been observed be-
fore by one of us (as reported in Buzin and Lubarev, 2008, p 201), used
in our preliminary work (Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov, 2012), and
also mentioned by Mebane et al. (Mebane and Kalinin, 2009, 2014; Kalinin
and Mebane, 2010; Mebane, 2013b). Here we demonstrate that it is only
a part of a more general phenomenon: anomalously high incidence of high
integer percentages. We used Monte Carlo simulations to confirm statistical
significance of this anomaly and measure its size. We argue that it presents
a convincing evidence of election fraud that was absent in 2000 and 2003
federal elections, appeared in 2004 and has remained ever since.
2. Materials and methods.
2.1. Background. Our analysis involves seven Russian federal elections:
four presidential (2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012) and three legislative ones
(2003, 2007, 2011). In each of these elections, the winner was either Vladimir
Putin (2000, 2004, 2012) or his prote´ge´ Dmitry Medvedev (2008), or the pro-
1Press conference of Vladimir Putin, 2011: http://www.rg.ru/2011/12/15/
stenogramma.html (in Russian); Interview with the press attache for the president,
Dmitry Peskov, 2011: http://lenta.ru/news/2011/12/12/noeffect (in Russian).
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government party United Russia (2003, 2007, 2011). We always refer to the
winner candidate or party as “leader”.
The legislative elections in 2007 and 2011 were conducted under a nation-
wide proportional system (i.e. the seats in the parliament were distributed
between parties according to the proportion of votes for each party). The
2003 legislative election was mixed, with half of the deputies elected in a
nationwide proportional election and another half in majoritarian districts
(with each district electing one member of parliament); here we consider
only the proportional part. The presidential elections are direct (i.e. people
vote directly for the candidates and not for the electors as is the case in
indirect elections), and in all elections under consideration the winner was
determined in the first round, although the second round was in principle
possible.
The total number of registered voters in Russia in 2000–2012 was about
108 million (107.2 to 109.8 million for different elections), and the total
number of polling stations varied from 95 181 to 96 612. At a lower level,
the polling stations are grouped into constituencies (2744 to 2755 in total)
corresponding to administrative territorial division. Constituencies vary in
size and may contain from a few to more than a hundred polling stations.
Constituency-level electoral commissions gather voting data in the form of
paper protocols from the polling stations and enter them into the nationwide
computerized database (“GAS Vybory”).
At a higher level, in 2012 Russia was divided into 83 federal regions. The
number of regions slightly decreased from 2000 to 2012, as several regions
were merged. In our analysis of earlier elections we combined the regions that
would later be merged officially to keep consistency with the 2012 nomen-
clature.
2.2. Data. The raw election data with detalization to polling stations are
officially published at the website of Russian Central Election Committee
(izbirkom.ru) as multiple separate HTML pages and Excel reports. For our
analysis, these data were downloaded with custom software scripts to form
a joint database. The accuracy of the resulting databases was verified by
checking regional subtotals and comparing a number of randomly chosen
polling stations with the respective information at the official website. The
parts of election databases relevant for the current study are provided as
Supplementary Materials.
For the 2003–2012 elections, detailed data are available for each and every
polling station in the country. For the 2000 election, the polling station level
data are missing for the Republics of Chechnya and Sakha-Yakutia, and for
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several constituencies in other regions; available data cover 91 333 polling
stations (∼95% of total number) and 105.6 million voters (97.3% of total
number).
For each polling station i the following values (among many more) are
available: the number Vi of registered voters, the number Gi of given bal-
lots2, the number Bi of cast ballots (sum of valid and invalid ballots), and
the number Li of ballots cast for the leader. In some cases, Bi is not equal
to Gi due to taken away (not cast into the box) ballots; this fraction is
small, ∼0.1–0.3%. According to Russian electoral laws3, turnout Ti at a
given polling station is defined as Ti = Gi/Vi · 100% and leader’s result Ri
as Ri = Li/Bi · 100%. Although turnout lost its legal significance after 2006
electoral law amendments that abolished turnout thresholds, de facto it is
still customarily included in high-level official reports and, as our analy-
sis will show, remains an important reporting figure at lower levels of the
electoral system.
In special cases where Vi is not defined beforehand (e.g. in temporary
polling stations located at the train stations or airports), Vi is officially
reported as equal to Gi, automatically resulting in 100% turnout (3–5% of
all stations). We exclude all such stations from our analysis.
Official election results are reported at the national level only and are
calculated as
∑
Gi/
∑
Vi · 100% and ∑Li/∑Bi · 100% for turnout and re-
sult, respectively. Although the results at lower levels (region, constituency,
polling station) do not have any legal significance, they are nevertheless
available at the Central Election Committee official website down to single
polling station level.
2.3. Data from other countries. We used election data from three coun-
tries besides Russia: 2011 general election in Spain, 2010 presidential election
in Poland (1st round), and 2009 federal election in Germany (Zweitstimmen,
i.e. party votes). These three elections were chosen because the data are
publicly available down to the single polling station level, and because the
number and size of polling stations are comparable to those in Russia. The
winners of these elections were the People’s Party, Bronis law Komorowski,
and the CDU/CSU coalition respectively.
The Polish dataset is directly available at the official website in CSV for-
mat (prezydent2010.pkw.gov.pl), and the dataset for Spain is provided at the
2This is the sum of ballots given to the voters at the polling station at the election day,
ballots given to the voters outside of the polling station at the election day (in Russia it
is possible to vote at home), and ballots given during early voting.
3Federal law regulating parliamentary elections: http://cikrf.ru/law/federal_law/
zakon_51/gl11.html.
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official website (www.infoelectoral.mir.es) in a custom format that requires
decoding. The German dataset in CSV format was obtained by post on a CD
after a request to the German federal returning officer (bundeswahlleiter.de).
In all cases Vi is the number of registered voters and Li is the number of
ballots cast for the leader. In Spain Gi is defined as the sum of invalid, empty,
and valid cast ballots and Bi as the sum of empty and valid cast ballots. In
Germany Gi is defined as the sum of invalid and valid cast ballots and Bi as
the number of valid ballots. In Poland Gi is defined as the number of given
ballots and Bi as the number of valid cast ballots.
The total number of polling stations is 25 774 for Poland, 59 928 for Spain,
and 75 096 for Germany (in Germany we excluded from the total number of
88 705 stations those 9609 of them lacking information about the number of
registered voters).
3. Results.
3.1. Integer anomaly. To avoid any a priori assumptions about what
constitutes a “round” percentage (multiple of 10? multiple of 5? any even
number?), we chose to look at all integer percentages. As it is often im-
possible to achieve an exactly integer percentage at a given polling station
because voter and ballot counts are integer (e.g. on a polling station with
974 registered voters the closest possible value to 70% turnout is 70.02%
with 682 people participating in the election), we counted as integer all per-
centage values deviating from an integer by at most 0.05 percentage points.
With characteristic number of ballots per station being ∼1000, such preci-
sion could almost always be achieved.
For each year we counted the number of polling stations where either
turnout or leader’s result were given by an integer percentage ±0.05% (Fig-
ure 1A, dots); we will call those “integer polling stations”. Prior to this
counting, we excluded all polling stations with turnout or result being over
99% because a large number of stations are reported with a formal turnout
of 100% which is an integer; we wish to exclude these from the analysis (see
Section 2.2). All polling stations with less than 100 registered voters were
excluded as well because those are often temporary polling stations with
some special status. The number q of integer polling stations among the
remaining n stations is our main statistic.
One could think that in a fair election the chance for the turnout to be
given by an integer±0.05% is 1/10, and the same is true for the leader’s
result; it follows that q should be approximately equal to [1 − (9/10)2]n =
0.19n. However, the distribution of q is affected by the distribution of polling
station sizes: e.g. at a polling station with 100 registered people, all possible
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Fig 1. (A) Number of polling stations with integer turnout or result percentage value,
±0.05% (blue dots). Box plots show distributions of the same quantity expected by chance,
obtained from binomial Monte Carlo simulations. Boxes show 0.5% and 99.5% percentiles
together with the median value (horizontal line), whiskers extend from the minimal to the
maximal value obtained in all 10 000 Monte Carlo runs. Grey vertical lines next to the
box plots show 99% percentile intervals of beta-binomial Monte Carlo simulations. (B)
The same as in (A), but with mean value of Monte Carlo distribution subtracted from
empirical values for each year to highlight the deviations between the two. (C) The same
as in (B), but computed with various window sizes around integer values and converted to
z-scores: empirical value minus mean Monte Carlo value, divided by the standard deviation
of Monte Carlo values. Each curve corresponds to one particular year (see legend). Grey
shading shows 99.5% Monte Carlo percentiles (z ≈ 2.5).
turnouts are integer. In particular for small polling stations the probability
of q/n can noticeably deviate from 0.19. For that reason we used Monte
Carlo simulation to sample from the null distribution of q.
Specifically, Monte Carlo simulations were based on the following null
hypothesis: first, the election outcome at each polling station represents the
true average intentions of voters at that particular location, and second, each
person at each polling station votes freely and independently. Accordingly,
for each polling station i we modeled the turnout as a random variable
TMCi = G
MC
i /Vi · 100%, GMCi ∼ Binom(Vi, Gi/Vi),
and the leader’s result as a random variable
RMCi = L
MC
i /Bi · 100%, LMCi ∼ Binom(Bi, Li/Bi).
Note that for large Vi  1 and Bi  1 this yields the following Gaussian
approximation (not used in actual simulations):
TMCi ∼˙ N (Ti, Ti(100− Ti) / Vi)
RMCi ∼˙ N (Ri, Ri(100−Ri)/Bi),
meaning that e.g. for a polling station with 1000 registered voters and 60%
turnout TMC ∼˙ N (60, 2.4).
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After generating TMCi and R
MC
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the main statistic q
was computed as described above, and this procedure was repeated 10 000
times to obtain 10 000 values of q sampled from the null distribution (a
typical run of 10 000 Monte Carlo iterations took ∼8h on a single core of
an Intel i7 3.2 GHz processor). As a result, for each year we obtained a
distribution of the amount of integer polling stations that could have arisen
purely by chance, under the null hypothesis of no manipulations (Figure 1A,
box plots).
Figure 1A shows that in 2000 and 2003 the empirical number of integer
polling stations (computed from the actual electoral data) falls well within
the 99% percentile interval of the Monte Carlo values. However, starting
from 2004, the empirical number by far exceeds all 10 000 Monte Carlo
values, meaning that the observed number of integer polling stations could
almost certainly not have occurred by chance. Therefore, the null hypothesis
of no manipulations of the electoral results can be rejected with p < 0.0001.
Figure 1B shows how much the number of integer polling stations in each
year exceeded the mean Monte Carlo value (i. e. the most likely value in
the absence of manipulations): starting with 2004, the resulting “anomaly”
is around 1000 polling stations, and it peaks in 2008 reaching almost 2000
polling stations.
The exact size of the anomaly depends on the window size used to define
what percentage values are counted as being close enough to an integer.
However, the anomaly sizes remain almost the same with windows ranging
from around ±0.05% size (used above) to around ±0.15%, and the z-scores
peak around ±0.05% as shown on Figure 1C. Larger windows yield smaller
and less significant anomalies (see also Figure 6 below), dropping to zero at
±0.5% window that simply counts all polling stations and therefore yields
q = n.
3.2. Controls. We ran a number of controls to ensure that the integer
anomaly is a real and nontrivial effect.
First, the same anomaly can be computed for turnout and leader’s result
separately. In both cases, the number of integer polling stations is well above
the whole Monte Carlo range, as before (Figure 2A–B).
Second, one can worry that high number of integer polling stations can
arise in fair elections due to artifacts of division of small integers (John-
ston, Schroder and Mallawaaratchy, 1995) (even though small polling sta-
tions with less than 100 registered voters were excluded from our analysis).
This cannot be so, because the same artifacts would then also appear in
Monte Carlo simulations and would not make the empirical number of inte-
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Fig 2. (A–B) The same as in Figure 1A, but the number of integer polling stations was
computed separately for turnout (A) and leader’s result (B). Here and below, in addition
to each year, we show the mean value over all seven years, in order to increase signal-
to-noise ratio. (C–D) Number of registered voters on all integer polling stations. (E–F)
Number of integer polling stations, after excluding all polling stations where either the
number of given ballots or the number of registered voters ended in zero (for turnout, E);
or where either the number of cast ballots or the number of ballots cast for the leader ended
in zero (for leader’s result, F). (G–H) Number of half-integer polling stations, i.e. polling
stations reporting turnout (G) or result (H) differing by at most 0.05 percentage points
from a half-integer percentage.
ger polling stations appear exceptional. Still, in addition to counting integer
polling stations, we also computed the sum of registered voters at all integer
polling stations (Figure 2C–D). This metric is mostly influenced by large
polling stations. Significant and substantial anomalies in all years after 2004
confirm our conclusions and indicate that the integer anomaly is not an
effect of small stations.
Third, it has been proposed before (Beber and Scacco, 2012) that a higher
than expected number of polling stations reporting round (i.e. ending in 0)
counts of registered voters, cast ballots, etc., can be taken as an evidence
of fraud. Nonetheless, one can argue that such round counts can occur due
to “innocent” (but still illegal) rounding in the exhausting manual ballot
counting and do not necessarily imply a malicious fraud. Crucially, this is
not the case for the anomaly reported here because the official precinct pa-
per protocols in Russia contain only ballot counts, and do not contain either
turnout or leader’s result in percent. However, the performance of a ballot
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station is likely to be judged by higher authorities by the shown percentages,
prompting to fiddle with the ballot counts until appealing percentages are
obtained. Notably, in most cases this requires non-round ballot counts. We
have checked consistency of this argument by excluding all polling stations
with round counts: the number of integer-turnout polling stations was com-
puted without counting stations where either Ti or Vi ended on zero, and
the number of integer-result polling stations was computed without counting
stations where either Ri or Bi ended on zero (Figure 2E–F). This decreased
the anomalous number of round percentages only slightly.
Fourth, we computed the number of polling stations with turnout or re-
sult differing by at most ±0.05% percentage points from a half-integer (as
opposed to integer) percentage. This serves as a consistency check that, as
expected, shows no significant effect in any year (Figure 2G–H).
Fifth, do our conclusions depend on the particular details of the Monte
Carlo simulation? We argue that they do not. In addition to the binomial
distribution, we also used the beta-binomial one:
GMCi ∼ Binom(Vi, pi), pi ∼ Beta(Gi + 1, Vi −Gi + 1),
LMCi ∼ Binom(Bi, pi), pi ∼ Beta(Li + 1, Bi − Li + 1).
This choice is motivated as follows. The observed turnout and leader’s re-
sult are not exact measurements of voters’ intentions, and one can estimate
the conditional distribution of true voters’ intentions pi given the observed
value and the uniform prior — this leads to the beta distribution. When a
beta-distributed pi is used as a parameter for the binomial distribution, the
compound distribution becomes beta-binomial. We performed beta-binomial
Monte Carlo simulations (1000 iterations), and the null distributions hardly
changed at all (Figure 1A).
Binomial distribution has been successfully used to describe statistics
of election results across very different countries (Borghesi, Raynal and
Bouchaud, 2012). For some countries, the data suggest that voters tend to
vote in clusters, corresponding e.g. to families. This positive correlation be-
tween voters leads to higher variance of simulated outcomes at each polling
station compared to the binomial distribution, and the integer percentages
observed in the actual data would be smeared even stronger in the simulated
data. To confirm this, we ran Monte Carlo simulations with various values
of cluster sizes up to 10 and did not observe any excess of integer polling
stations in the simulations.
The behaviour of actual voters is likely described by even more complex
distributions, capturing perhaps some correlations between candidates and
non-independence of voters. The existing evidence suggests that the more
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realistic distributions are overdispersed as compared to the binomial one
(Borghesi, Raynal and Bouchaud, 2012). Whereas underdispersed distribu-
tions are theoretically possible, they seem unlikely to occur in real life (to
yield noticeable underdispersion, voters should e.g. be precisely orchestrated
or should en masse exhibit strong negative correlations). For these reasons
we believe that the binomial assumption is conservative for the current pur-
poses.
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Fig 3. Number of polling stations with integer turnout or result percentage value in three
different elections outside of Russia (blue dots). Box plots show distributions of the same
quantity expected by chance, obtained from binomial Monte Carlo simulations (as in Fig-
ure 1A). Grey lines show 99% percentile intervals from beta-binomial Monte Carlo simu-
lations.
Finally, we applied our analysis to three recent elections outside Russia:
one in Spain, one in Germany, and one in Poland. In each case we computed
1000 Monte Carlo iterations and in each case the number of integer polling
stations was well inside the 99% percentile interval of the Monte Carlo values
(Figure 3), demonstrating that the number of integer values was not at all
anomalous. In fact, in each case the number of integer polling stations was
very close to the mean Monte Carlo value, demonstrating adequacy of the
model.
3.3. Specific integers. Which integer percentages contributed most to
the integer anomaly? To answer this question, we considered histograms of
turnout and leader’s result for each year (Figure 4). To account for different
sizes of polling stations, we selected all polling stations exhibiting a particu-
lar turnout or leader’s result (in ±0.05% bins) and plotted the total number
of registered voters on these polling stations. The same histograms were
computed for the surrogate data obtained with Monte Carlo simulations,
and distributions of these surrogate histograms (99% percentile intervals)
are shown on Figure 4 as gray shaded areas. Note that the Monte Carlo
histograms follow the empirical ones very closely (except for a number of
integer peaks, see below), demonstrating self-consistency of the Monte Carlo
procedure.
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Starting from 2004, all empirical histograms exhibit pronounced sharp
peaks at all integer percentage values of turnout and/or leader’s result above
∼70%. At multiples-of-five (75%, 80%, 85%, etc.) percentage values that
are arguably more appealing, the peaks are particularly high (Buzin and
Lubarev, 2008; Mebane and Kalinin, 2009). Nevertheless, smaller but denser
peaks are also apparent at integer percentage values above ∼80% (e.g. at
91%, 92%, 93%, etc.). These peaks often reach well outside of the shaded
Monte Carlo area, meaning that for many of them their individual p-values
are less than 0.0001. Fourier analysis confirms that the peaks are strictly
equidistant with periods of 1% and 5% (Figure S1) and that such periodic
peaks appear only at high percentages, namely above ∼ 70% (Figure S2).
We carefully checked that these peaks are not the artifacts of division of
small integers (Johnston, Schroder and Mallawaaratchy, 1995). Such arti-
facts can be observed in the election histograms if one chooses a very small
bin size and counts polling stations directly instead of weighting them by
registered voter counts (as we do). This allows small polling stations to con-
tribute strongly to the distributions, leading to the artifact peaks at fractions
with small denominators (such as 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, i.e. 50%, 66%, 75%). The
peaks visible on Figure 4 are totally different from such artifacts, because
(i) they are strictly periodic, (ii) they are never observed at 50% where the
artifacts would be strongest, and (iii) they do not appear in Monte Carlo
simulations that involve exactly the same type of integer divisions4.
The integer peaks appear at the same positions in all years since 2004,
demonstrating that the same integer numbers remain to be particularly ap-
pealing. Due to this fact, averaging the histograms over the years increases
signal-to-noise ratio (Figure 5) allowing us to study the fine structure of the
peaks. As can be seen in the insets of Figure 5, the peaks are asymmetric:
sharp raising left flank is followed by a relaxed right tail.
To inspect this effect closer, we computed the average shape of all integer
peaks in Figure 5. We subtracted the respective Monte Carlo mean values
from the year-averaged turnout (Figure 5A) and leader’s result (Figure 5B)
histograms, and averaged them over all 1%-long intervals around integer
values (so the average was computed over 198 intervals, 99 for turnout and
99 for leader’s result, from 1% to 99%). Figure 6 confirms that the resulting
shape is indeed asymmetric. This behavior is consistent with the interpre-
4A convenient way to get rid of such artifacts is to add a random number sampled
from a uniform distribution U(−0.5, 0.5) to the nominator of each fraction, e.g. to the
number of given ballots when computing the turnout. This does not noticeably influence
the turnout value, but eliminates the problems associated with the division of integers.
We did not apply this procedure here, as the artifacts were negligible.
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tation that the polling station officials seem to be motivated to report a
turnout or result which is “just above” an appealing integer value, rather
than “just below” it. This leads to depletion of the votes right before an
integer value, a peak at the exact integer value, and subsequent relaxation
until the next integer value comes into play. This peculiar shape explains the
decrease of z-scores of the main anomaly as the window size around integer
percentages gets too broad (Figure 1C).
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Fig 6. Average shape of the integer peaks in Figure 5.
3.4. Geographic distribution of integer anomaly. Geographically, polling
stations contributing to the integer anomaly are not evenly distributed across
Russia, but tend to cluster in certain regions. To show this, we computed the
turnout and leader’s result histograms for each of the 7 elections in each of
the 83 Russian regions separately and ranked the regions by the magnitude
of the most conspicuous integer peak across years (Figure S3 and Table S4).
We found that the vast majority of the integer peaks originated from
15 regions, with the city of Moscow and the Moscow Region among them
(Figure 7). If these 15 regions (comprising ∼33 mln voters, ∼30% of the
national total) are excluded from the analysis, the integer peaks in both
turnout and leader’s result histograms become negligibly small (Figure 5,
red lines). Geographical clustering of integer polling stations strongly sug-
gests that there existed tacit inducement, encouragement or even coordi-
nating directives from the higher electoral commissions at the region level
towards the individual polling stations (note that each region in Russia has
its own electoral commission). Such conduct was rationalized by Kalinin and
Mebane (2010) as regions signaling their loyalty to the center.
3.5. Relation to other electoral anomalies. In a recent study (Klimek
et al., 2012), two features of post-2004 Russian elections have been suggested
as potential falsification fingerprints: high correlation between turnout and
leader’s result, and high amount of polling stations with both turnout and
leader’s result close to 100%. When the 15 aforementioned regions are ex-
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Fig 7. Fifteen regions identified as contributing the most to the integer anomaly. Regions
are designated by their ISO codes (see Table S4).
cluded from the analysis, both features substantially weaken or disappear
entirely.
This is illustrated by 2D histograms similar to the ones used in (Klimek
et al., 2012) (Figure 8). Klimek et al. hypothesized that there are two main
types of falsifications: “incremental fraud” when some extra ballots for the
leader are added (ballot stuffing), and “extreme fraud” when a polling sta-
tion reports almost 100% turnout and almost 100% leader’s result. On a
2D turnout-result histogram the first type of fraud shows as an extremely
high correlation between turnout and leader’s result, while the second type
of fraud gives rise to a separate second cluster near 100%-turnout, 100%-
result point. Indeed, both features are present in Russian elections after 2004
(Figure 8A).
When the 15 regions demonstrating most prominent integer anomalies
are excluded, the high-percentage cluster fully vanishes, and the correlation
between turnout and leader’s result substantially weakens (Figure 8B). On
the other hand, if only these 15 regions are used for the histograms, both
anomalies become very prominent (Figure 8C).
The fact that the regions with the highest level of integer outcome anomaly
are almost exactly those exhibiting other suspicious features, provides jus-
tification to the previous forensic methods (Mikhailov, 2004; Myagkov, Or-
deshook and Shakin, 2009; Klimek et al., 2012; Simpser, 2013) and lends
additional support to the current interpretation.
4. Conclusions. In sum, our results present a historical overview of
the 2000–2012 Russian elections based on a novel statistical fraud indicator.
INTEGER PERCENTAGES AS FALSIFICATION FINGERPRINTS 15
0.24
0.05
0.58
0.44
0.25
0.63
0.4
0.15
0.76
0.62
0.46
0.81
0.55
0.42
0.7
0.71
0.6
0.82
0.58
0.37
0.82
All regions
Regions without integer peaks
15 regions with integer peaks
2000 2003 2004 2007 2008 2011 2012
0
10 000
20 000
A
B
C
0
100
Le
ad
er
's
 re
su
lt 
(%
)
50
50 100
Turnout (%)
Fig 8. (A) 2D histograms for all years: horizontal axis shows turnout in 0.5% bins, ver-
tical axis shows leader’s result in 0.5% bins, number of voters in the respective polling
stations is colour-coded. (B) The same for all regions apart from 15 regions demonstrat-
ing most prominent integer anomalies. (C) The same only for 15 regions demonstrating
most prominent integer anomalies. Summing the histograms on panels (B) and (C) gives
exactly the histograms from panel (A). Pearson correlation coefficient between turnout and
leader’s result (across all polling stations) is shown in the lower left corner of each diagram.
The elections in 2000 and in 2003 do not appear to show any strong sta-
tistical anomalies. The anomalous integer-value peaks indicative of electoral
manipulations popped up in 2004 and have persisted in the election data
ever since, reaching a maximum in 2008 elections won by Dmitry Medvedev.
What exactly happened during the three months between December 2003
and March 2004 when the respective elections were held, is an interesting
politological question which however falls outside of the scope of the current
paper. It remains to be seen if the anomalies discussed in this paper will
show up in the upcoming 2016 parliament elections.
One of the limitations of the forensic method presented here is that it
does not provide a way to estimate the overall impact of falsifications: not
all ballots at dishonest polling stations are necessarily fraudulent, and not
all dishonest polling stations report integer percentages. Nonetheless, agree-
ment of our findings with the previous studies (Klimek et al., 2012) at the
level of regions makes us believe that the excess of integer percentages is just
a tip-of-the-iceberg effect unforeseen by the forgers. The real significance of
the fraud indicator described herein is in its irrefutable character.
In a wider perspective, the methodology developed in this paper can also
be useful for forensic studies of any datasets where percentages, or fractions,
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are of particular interest. Apart from the electoral data, this might be the
case for scientific datasets where our method can possibly inform future
investigations of scientific misconduct (Simonsohn, 2013).
Acknowledgements. We thank Sergey Slyusarev, Boris Ovchinnikov,
Peter Klimek, and Uri Simonsohn for comments and suggestions, Alexey
Shipilev for providing 2011–2012 election data on the fly, Alexander Shen
for enlightening comments on statistical testing, and Gu¨nter Ziegler for pro-
viding us with the raw election data from Germany.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Election data
(doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3126883; .zip). Datasets used
in this study (in tab-delimited plain text format).
INTEGER PERCENTAGES AS FALSIFICATION FINGERPRINTS 17
References.
Beber, B. and Scacco, A. (2012). What the numbers say: A digit-based test for election
fraud. Political Analysis 20 211–234.
Borghesi, C., Raynal, J.-C. and Bouchaud, J.-P. (2012). Election turnout statistics in
many countries: similarities, differences, and a diffusive field model for decision-making.
PloS one 7 e36289.
Buzin, A. and Lubarev, A. (2008). Crime without punishment (Prestuplenie bez
nakazanija). Moscow: Nikkolo M.
Churov, V. E., Arlazarov, V. L. and Soloviev, A. V. (2008). Itogi vyborov. Analiz
elektoralnykh predpochtenij (Election outcome. Analysis of electoral preferences). In
Trudy instituta sistemnogo analiza Rossijskoj akademii nauk. Sbornik: matematika i
upravlenie.
Coleman, S. (2004). The effect of social conformity on collective voting behavior. Political
analysis 12 76–96.
Crawford, F. W., Weiss, R. E. and Suchard, M. A. (2014). Sex, lies, and self-reported
counts: Bayesian mixture models for longitudinal heaped count data via birth-death
processes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.4265.
Deckert, J., Myagkov, M. and Ordeshook, P. C. (2011). Benford’s law and the
detection of election fraud. Political Analysis 19 245–268.
Enikolopov, R., Korovkin, V., Petrova, M., Sonin, K. and Zakharov, A. (2013).
Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 448–452.
Hansford, T. G. and Gomez, B. T. (2010). Estimating the electoral effects of voter
turnout. American Political Science Review 104 268–288.
Harris, L. (1991). Stock price clustering and discreteness. Review of Financial Studies 4
389–415.
Johnston, R. G., Schroder, S. D. and Mallawaaratchy, A. R. (1995). Statistical
artifacts in the ratio of discrete quantities. The American Statistician 49 285–291.
Kalinin, K. and Mebane, W. R. (2010). Understanding Electoral Frauds through Evo-
lution of Russian Federalism: from “Bargaining Loyalty” to “Signaling Loyalty”. In
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.
Kandel, S., Sarig, O. and Wohl, A. (2001). Do investors prefer round stock prices?
Evidence from Israeli IPO auctions. Journal of banking & finance 25 1543–1551.
Klimek, P., Yegorov, Y., Hanel, R. and Thurner, S. (2012). Statistical detection of
systematic election irregularities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109
16469–16473.
Klumpp, J. M., Brorsen, B. W. and Anderson, K. B. (2005). The Preference for
Round Number Prices. In Annual Meeting of the Southern Agricultural Economics As-
sociation, Little Rock, Arkansas 35537. Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
Kobak, D., Shpilkin, S. and Pshenichnikov, M. S. (2012). Statistical anomalies
in 2011-2012 Russian elections revealed by 2D correlation analysis. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1205.0741.
Lynn, M., Flynn, S. M. and Helion, C. (2013). Do consumers prefer round prices? Ev-
idence from pay-what-you-want decisions and self-pumped gasoline purchases. Journal
of Economic Psychology 36 96–102.
Mack, V. and Shikano, S. (2013). Benford’s Law-test on trial. Simulation-based appli-
cation to the latest election results from France and Russia. In Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago.
Mebane, W. R. (2006). Election forensics: Vote counts and Benford’s law. In Summer
18 D. KOBAK ET AL.
Meeting of the Political Methodology Society, UC-Davis.
Mebane, W. R. (2013a). Election Forensics: The Meanings of Precinct Vote Counts’
Second Digits. In Summer Meeting of the Political Methodology Society, UC-Davis.
Mebane, W. R. (2013b). Using Vote Counts’ Digits to Diagnose Strategies and Frauds:
Russia. In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Mebane, W. R. and Kalinin, K. (2009). Comparative election fraud detection. In Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto.
Mebane, W. R. and Kalinin, K. (2010). Electoral fraud in Russia: vote counts analy-
sis using second-digit mean tests. In Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago.
Mebane, W. R. and Kalinin, K. (2014). Geography in Election Forensics. In Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Mikhailov, V. (2004). Regional elections and democratization in Russia. In Russian
politics under Putin (C. Ross, ed.) 198–220. Manchester University Press.
Myagkov, M., Ordeshook, P. C. and Shakin, D. (2009). The forensics of election
fraud: Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge University Press.
Osler, C. L. (2003). Currency orders and exchange rate dynamics: an explanation for
the predictive success of technical analysis. The Journal of Finance 58 1791–1820.
Pope, D. and Simonsohn, U. (2011). Round Numbers as Goals. Evidence From Baseball,
SAT Takers, and the Lab. Psychological science 22 71–79.
Simonsohn, U. (2013). Just Post It. The Lesson From Two Cases of Fabricated Data
Detected by Statistics Alone. Psychological science 24 1875–1888.
Simpser, A. (2013). Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice,
and implications. Cambridge University Press.
Yule, G. U. (1927). On reading a scale. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 570–587.
Ziegler, G. M. (2013). Mathematik — Das ist doch keine Kunst! Albrecht Knaus Verlag.
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
See next page.
Dmitry Kobak
Champalimaud Centre for the Unknown,
Lisbon, Portugal
E-mail: dmitry.kobak@neuro.fchampalimaud.org
Sergey Shpilkin
Moscow, Russia
E-mail: podmoskovnik@gmail.com
Maxim Pshenichnikov
Groningen, Netherlands
E-mail: maxim.pshenichnikov@gmail.com
INTEGER PERCENTAGES AS FALSIFICATION FINGERPRINTS 19
1000
0.2
2000
Am
pl
itu
de
2
A B
C D
Fourier spectra of turnout histograms Fourier spectra of leader's result histograms
2000
2003
2004
2007
2008
2011
2012
Spectrum of year-average turnout Spectrum of year-average leader's result
0.2
1 2 1 2
Frequency (%−1) Frequency (%−1)
0.2 0.2
1 2 1
Am
pl
itu
de
Fig S1. (A) Fourier amplitude spectra of turnout histograms from Figure 4A for all elec-
tions from 2000 to 2012 (top to bottom). Harmonics at 1%−1 and 2%−1 correspond to
periodic peaks in Figure 4A appearing with 1% intervals, while harmonics at 0.2%−1,
0.4%−1 etc. are characteristic for periodic peaks appearing every 5%. (B) Fourier spectra
of leader’s result histograms from Figure 1B. (C) Fourier spectrum of the year-averaged
turnout histogram from Figure 5A. Note that as the peaks become more prominent in
the year-average histograms, the corresponding peaks in the Fourier spectrum are also
boosted. (D) Fourier spectrum of the year-averaged leader’s result histogram from Fig-
ure 5B. Shaded areas on all panels show 99% percentile intervals of the respective Monte
Carlo spectra. The Fourier amplitude spectra were computed as absolute value of the dis-
crete Fourier transform normalized by the sampling length (100/0.1 = 1000).
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Fig S2. (A) Fourier spectrogram of the year-averaged turnout histogram from Figure 5A.
The Fourier transform was computed in a sliding 15%-wide Hamming window. The hori-
zontal axis shows the position of the centre of the window and ranges from 7.5% to 92.5%.
The vertical axis shows the frequency and ranges from 0 to 5%−1 (with 5%−1 being the
Nyquist frequency given our resolution of 0.1%). The spectrogram was normalized (sepa-
rately for each percent-frequency value) by the average over 10 000 spectrograms obtained
with year-averaged Monte Carlo histograms (see Figure 5A). Resulting values are colour-
coded. (B) The same procedure was repeated for each year separately using histograms
from Figure 4A, and the relative amplitude of 1%−1 harmonic (representing amplitudes of
both 5% and 1% peaks) is shown for each year. The interpretation of this panel is that the
periodic peaks begin to appear around high values of the turnout and result (∼70%), and
the magnitude of peak harmonics steadily increases all the way up to 100%.(C) The rela-
tive amplitude of 1%−1 harmonic in the last 85–100% window for each year. The values
correspond to the rightmost values of the functions displayed on Panel (B). (D–F) The
same for leader’s result histograms.
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Fig S3. (A) Amplitude of the most prominent integer peak for each year (horizontal axis)
in each of the 83 regions (vertical axis). The amplitude was defined as the difference between
an empirical value and a corresponding mean Monte Carlo value. The most prominent
integer peak was identified as the one having maximal amplitude over all integer values
between 70% and 99% in both turnout and leader’s result histograms (i.e. the maximum
over 29 · 2 = 58 values). There are 15 regions (see Table S4) exhibiting noticeable integer
peaks, many of them in several elections. (B) For comparison: amplitude of the most
prominent peak over all half-integer percentage values between 70.5% and 99.5%. These
data show that there are much fewer peaks located at half-integer positions (apart from the
one in Republic of Chechnya in 2011 located at 99.5% and corresponding to 99.5% result
for Vladimir Putin at the polling stations in this region). Regions are marked with their
ISO 3166-2 codes, with RU- prefix omitted. Half of the regions are named on the left and
the other half in the middle. Both panels contain the same number of rows (regions).
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ISO code Region name Maximal integer anomaly (103)
DA Dagestan, Respublika 87
BA Bashkortostan, Respublika 64
KEM Kemerovskaya Oblast 52
KDA Krasnodarskiy Krai 51
KO Komi, Respublika 38
MOS Moskovskaya Oblast 35
MOW Moscow 34
KB Kabardino-Balkarskaya Respublika 33
TA Tatarstan, Respublika 33
ROS Rostovskaya Oblast 33
IN Ingushetiya, Respublika 28
SE Severanaya Osetiya-Alaniya, Respublika 24
MO Mordoviya, Respublika 23
KC Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya Respublika 21
CE Chechenskaya Respublika 18
Table S4. Top 15 regions contributing to the integer anomaly. For each region we report
the height of the maximal integer peak, where maximum is taken over all years, over both
turnout and leader’s result, and over all integer percentage values from 70% to 99%. Peak
heights are measured relative to the mean Monte Carlo value. ISO codes are given according
to the ISO 3166-2 standard, with RU- prefix omitted.
